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FATHER KNOWS BEST-BUT WHICH FATHER?
CALIFORNIA'S PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY LOSES ITS
CONCLUSIVENESS: MICHAEL H.
v. GERALD D. AND ITS AFTERMATH
King John-Sirrah, your brother is legitimate;
Your father's wife did after wedlock bear him;
And, if she did play false, the fault was hers;
Which fault lies on the hazards of all husbands
That marry wives.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The presumption of legitimacy, that a woman's husband is the fa-
ther of any children born into their marriage, was a fundamental princi-
ple of the common law2 and has long been accepted by the California
legislature and courts.3 Until fairly recently, this presumption of legiti-
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN act 1, sc. 1 (William G. Clark & William A.
Wright eds., 1980).
2. The presumption was first termed the marital presumption, and was known as Lord
Mansfield's Rule. See Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777). It provided that a
woman's husband is the father of all children born during their marriage. See id. "[lit is a
rule founded in decency, morality, and policy, that they shall not be permitted to say after
marriage, that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is spurious ....
Id.
3. California codified the presumption for the first time in 1872. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1962(5), as amended, ch. 948, § 3, 1955 Cal. Stat. 1835 (repealed Jan. 1, 1967). This enact-
ment was based on the fact that it was impossible to establish paternity when it was in dispute.
In re Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298, 302, 70 P. 91, 93 (1902). Several early cases upheld the
conclusiveness of the presumption. In re Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 100, 183 P. 552,
563 (1919); In re Estate of Walker, 176 Cal. 402, 413, 168 P. 689, 700 (1917); Mills, 137 Cal. at
302, 70 P. at 93. However, even before the rule was adopted by the legislature, the presump-
tion was accepted by courts and was treated as an established rule of evidence. See, ag.,
People v. Anderson, 26 Cal. 129, 133-34 (1864).
The California legislature continued to keep the conclusive presumption intact until 1990,
although technology that would make the determination of paternity nearly foolproof has been
available for a number of years. See SIDNEY B. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEED-
INGS §§ 11.01-11.06 (4th ed. 1990); Comment, The California Blood Test Act v. The Presump-
tion of Legitimacy, 7 STAN. L. REv. 388, 391-92 (1955). Before 1991, section 621 of the
California Evidence Code provided as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), if the court finds that the
conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon blood tests...
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macy was a conclusive presumption4 and was quite controversial.' The
validity of the presumption was premised primarily on the notion that
the state had several strong interests in cases involving the presumption;
6
most important was its interest in preserving the integrity of the family.
Although these state interests may be significant and perhaps even
admirable, they sometimes bear little or no relation to the facts of a par-
ticular case. For this reason, there has been much controversy and criti-
cism of the application of the presumption.8 Furthermore, state interests
are that the husband is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the
husband shall be resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by
the husband not later than two years from the child's date of birth.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by
the mother of the child not later than two years from the child's date of birth if the
child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity
of the child.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1990), amended by ch. 543, § 2 (codified at CAL.
EVID. CODE § 621(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1991)).
4. A conclusive presumption is "one in which proof of basic fact renders the existence of
the presumed fact conclusive and irrebutable .... Few in number and often statutory, the
majority view is that a conclusive presumption is in reality a substantive rule of law, not a rule
of evidence." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1186 (6th ed. 1990).
The United States Supreme Court has questioned the use of conclusive presumptions as a
means of dictating social policy. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). In Viandis, the
Court stated that conclusive presumptions are constitutionally suspect in cases where (1) the
presumed facts are not universally true; (2) reasonable alternative means exist to determine
actual facts; and (3) the presumption affects an important right or a right which is constitu-
tionally protected. Id. at 448-52.
5. See infra note 8.
6. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
7. See McNamara, 181 Cal. at 95, 183 P. at 557; Walker, 176 Cal. at 410, 168 P. at 691-
92; Mills, 137 Cal. at 302, 70 P. at 93. The integrity of the family unit has found protection in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-
94, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
8. See, eg., Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988);
Magdalene Schoch, Determination of Paternity By Blood-Grouping Tests: The European Expe-
rience, 16 S. CAL. L. REv. 177 (1943); Albert T. Blanford, Jr., Note, Evidence: Bastards:
Infants: Parent and Child: Blood Tests As Proof of Non-Parentage, 39 CAL. L. REV. 277
(1951); John J.O. Bois, Sr., Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its
Legal Effect and Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 437 (1962); James J.
Brown, Comment, Presumptions of Legitimacy and Related Problems, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 538
(1950); Comment, The California Blood Test Act v. The Presumption ofLegitimacy, 7 STAN. L.
REv. 388 (1955); Note, Evidence: Disputable Presumption of Parentage in California, 11 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 200 (1959); Comment, Legitimation Through Acts: Acknowledgment: Reception
into Family, 13 CAL. L. REv. 68 (1924); Stephen M. Robertson, Note, California's Conclusive
Presumption of Legitimacy: Jackson v. Jackson and Evidence Code Section 621, 19 HASTINGS
L.J. 963 (1968); J.E.T. Rutter, Note, Evidence-Bastards-"Exception" to the Conclusive Pre-
sumption of Legitimacy, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 185 (1955); Anson M. Whitfield, Note, Evidence:
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are not the only interests at stake in these cases.9 The mother of the
child, the husband of the mother, the father of the child, if not the hus-
band, who is usually referred to as the putative father,1" and the child,
each have interests, some or all of which may be opposed to the state's
interests. Perhaps most important of all is the "best interests of the
child,"11 which is the measure that the United States Supreme Court
considers of paramount importance in cases in which putative fathers
assert their paternal rights.12 To further complicate matters, not only are
the interests of these various individuals adverse to those of the state, but
these interests may, and frequently do, conflict with one another.
Until very recently, California's conclusive presumption was truly
conclusive to all except the husband and the wife, and even when the wife
wished to attempt rebuttal she had to be joined by the biological father.
13
However, in August 1990 the California legislature amended California's
conclusive presumption to enable a putative father or child, in addition
to the husband or wife, to attempt to rebut the presumption under cer-
tain conditions.14 The amendment seems to have been inspired in large
part by the United States Supreme Court's affirmance in 1989 of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,1 and the
subsequent lobbying of the California legislature by Michael H., the
nonvictorious party in that case.' 6
In Michael H., a putative father who had an established relation-
ship 7 with his child was denied the opportunity to prove his paternity
Presumptions of Legitimacy: Cohabitation and the Use of Blood Tests--Kusior v. Silver, 48
CAL. L. REV. 852 (1960).
9. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of some of the other
interests that play a role in cases involving the conclusive presumption of legitimacy.
10. A putative father is the "alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
11. The "best interests of the child" is the standard courts use to determine the care and
custody needs of a child when the family can no longer meet those needs. ELEANOR RUBIN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FAMILY 165-67 (1986). The major premise of the "best
interests of the child" standard is that adults are capable of acting in their own best interests
without government assistance or interference, whereas children are presumed to be incompe-
tent to protect their own interests. Id. Children are viewed as being dependent on others to
assume this responsibility for them. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST IN-
TERESTS OF THE CHILD 1 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254 (1978).
13. See supra note 3.
14. Ch. 543, § 2 (codified at CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1991)).
15. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), aff'g 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
16. Marcia Coyle, After the Gavel Comes Down, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 1991, at 1.
17. See infra notes 72, 87-93 & 97-103 and accompanying text, for an explanation of the
significance of an established relationship.
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and legal right to visitation."8 At the time the case was heard by the
United States Supreme Court, the child was living with the mother and
her husband. 9 The plurality's opinion held that the state was not re-
quired to recognize a claim of paternity asserted by a man other than the
mother's husband.20 The Court's ruling was based upon the specific facts
presented, which were that during both the conception and birth of the
child, the mother was married to and cohabiting with her husband, and
that the mother and father, at the time of the suit, wished to raise the
child as their own.2 However, the Court implied that the presumption
of legitimacy might be disregarded under different circumstances.22
This Comment analyzes recent developments in California's conclu-
sive presumption of legitimacy, and how these developments affect puta-
tive fathers and their rights. The Comment first explains how California
courts have applied the presumption in the past, and then discusses the
Michael H. decision. The Comment then examines post-Michael H.
cases, and demonstrates how California courts have interpreted Michael
H. to allow them to disregard the presumption when presented with dif-
ferent facts. A discussion and critique of the recent amendment to sec-
tion 621 of the California Evidence Code, California's conclusive
presumption, which allows a putative father or child an opportunity to
attempt to rebut the presumption, follows. Finally, because the amend-
ment will not always obtain just results, the author proposes an alterna-
tive which would better further all the interests implicated in these
difficult and emotional cases.
II. BACKGROUND
To better understand all of the complex issues which arise in cases
involving the conclusive presumption of legitimacy, it is necessary to first
recognize the various interests that may come into play when these cases
are litigated. It will also be helpful to review the status of the constitu-
tional rights of unwed fathers, to determine whether these rights are be-
ing adequately protected or violated by application of the conclusive
18. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126-30.
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id. at 129-30.
21. Id. Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality and was joined by Chief 2ustice Rehnquist
and in part by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment. Id. at 132-36. The plurality stated that it is not unconstitutional
for the state to choose the husband instead of the natural father as the exclusive legal father of
the child and to prohibit inquiries into the paternity of a child in this particular situation,
where the mother and her husband wished to raise the child jointly. Id.
22. Id. at 129.
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presumption. Finally, this section concludes with a discussion of Califor-
nia courts' treatment of the conclusive presumption prior to Michael H.
v. Gerald D. ,23 in order to put that decision in proper perspective.
A. Competing Policies
There are many interests invoked in cases involving the conclusive
presumption of legitimacy. The state has a strong interest in these cases,
but it clearly is not the only concerned party. The child's mother, the
child's biological father, the child, and the mother's husband, are all par-
ties keenly interested in the outcome of these cases.
The state has several interests in these cases. First, the state has a
very strong interest in preserving the integrity of the family;24 it also has
a strong desire to protect the innocent child from the social stigma of
illegitimacy.25 Furthermore, the state wants to ensure that an individual,
rather than it, will assume the financial burden of supporting the child.26
Finally, another legitimate interest that the state might assert in support
of the conclusive presumption is speed and efficiency of judicial
determinations.27
The putative father also has a stake in the outcome of these cases, as
does the mother's husband, the child, and the child's mother. The puta-
tive father may have an interest in developing or maintaining a relation-
ship with his child, regardless of the child's present living arrangements,
and thus may wish to judicially establish his claimed biological relation-
ship." The mother's husband may have an interest in disproving his
paternity if he suspects his wife's child is not biologically his.29 On the
other hand, the mother's husband may wish to keep his family intact,
23. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), aff'g 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
24. Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 362-63, 703 P.2d 88, 92-93, 216 Cal. Rptr.
748, 752 (1985); Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d 461, 464-65, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545, 674
P.2d 245, 247 (1984); see Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 619, 354 P.2d 657, 667-68, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 139 (1960); In re Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 95, 183 P. 552, 557 (1919); In
re Estate of Walker, 176 Cal. 402, 410, 168 P. 689, 691-92 (1917); In re Estate of Mills, 137
Cal. 298, 302, 70 P. 91, 93 (1902).
25. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 650, 532 P.2d 123, 132, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 484 (1975);
In re Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 159 P.2d 643, 648 (1945); McNamara, 181 Cal. at
95, 183 P. at 557; Walker, 176 Cal. at 410, 168 P. at 691-92; Mills, 137 Cal. at 302, 70 P. at 93-
94.
26. Lisa K, 13 Cal. 3d at 650, 532 P.2d at 132, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
27. Id.
28. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1008, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 818
(1987).
29. See In re Marriage of Stephen & Sharyne B., 124 Cal. App. 3d 524, 526-27, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 429, 430 (1981).
November 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:275
even if the child is not biologically related to him.3" Finally, both the
child and the child's mother may have personal interests in establishing
the biological father's identity.31
B. United States Supreme Court Rulings on the
Rights of Unwed Fathers
The rights of fathers with respect to their illegitimate children have
been established by a series of United States Supreme Court cases dealing
with the termination of parental rights and consent to adoption.3 2 Stan-
ley v. Illinois33 was the first case to come before the Supreme Court that
began the process of changing the status of the unwed father who was
looking for recognition of his parental status. In Stanley, an unmarried
man and woman, Peter and Joan Stanley, had three children while "in-
termittently" living together for over eighteen years.34 When Joan died,
the state of Illinois, pursuant to its statute which did not recognize paren-
tal rights for fathers of illegitimate children,35 declared the children
wards of the state and assumed their custody.36
Peter Stanley, the biological father of the children, sued the state,
claiming that he had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.37  The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected Stanley's claim.38 The United States Supreme
30. See Michael H., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1009, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
31. Ruddock v. OhIs, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 277, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1979); see Schumm
v. Berg, 37 C.2d 174, 184, 231 P.2d 39, 44 (1951).
32. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that father who has participated
in raising his illegitimate children and has developed relationship with those children has con-
stitutionally protected parental rights); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding
invalid on equal protection grounds statute under which man's children could be adopted by
their biological mother and her husband without biological father's consent, when statute did
require mother's consent for adoption); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that
biological father's due process rights were not violated by state's application of best interests of
child standard); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding invalid Illinois statute which
erected conclusive presumption that unwed fathers were unfit parents).
33. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
34. Id. at 646.
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 701-14 (1972).
36. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. Under the Illinois law in effect at the time, the children of
unwed fathers became wards of the state upon the mother's death. Id. at 649. Therefore,
when Joan Stanley died, the State of Illinois instituted a dependency proceeding at which the
Stanley children were declared wards of the state and placed with court-appointed guardians.
Id.
37. Id. Stanley pointed out that married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived
of their children without first being shown to be unfit parents. Id. at 658. He argued that since
he had never been found to be an unfit parent, his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
right, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, had been violated. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
38. In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Illinois
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Court reversed, holding that a father has a Fourteenth Amendment due
process right39 to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before the state may
remove his children from his custody.' Furthermore, the Court held
that Illinois, in denying such a hearing to Peter Stanley while granting it
to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
The Court noted that the rights to conceive and to raise one's chil-
dren have been deemed "'essential,' "42 "'basic civil rights of man,' "I
and" '[r]ights far more precious... than property rights.' "I The Court
also noted that the law has not refused to recognize family relationships
unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.4" The Court concluded that a
parent's interest in "the companionship, care, custody, and management
of his or her children" warrants a great deal of respect from the Court.'
The Court decided that Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his chil-
dren was "cognizable and substantial."'47 In sum, the United States
Supreme Court held that unwed fathers who are exercising or have exer-
cised custodial responsibilities for their children have a constitutionally
protected interest in maintaining that established relationship."
Six years later, however, in Quilloin v. Walcott, 9 the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld a Georgia statute50 which provided that only the
mother of an illegitimate child need consent to the adoption of that
child.5 ' In Quilloin, the mother's husband sought to adopt the child af-
Supreme Court admitted that Stanley had not been shown to be an unfit parent. Id. at 815-16.
Nevertheless, the court rejected his equal protectibn claim, holding that Stanley could be sepa-
rated from his children simply upon proof that he and Joan had not been married. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
41. Id. at 658; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "'To say that the test of equal protection
should be the 'legal' rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal
Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal' line as it
chooses.'" Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (quoting Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968)).
42. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
43. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
44. Id. (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
45. Id.
46. Id. The Court implied that more respect was called for in a circumstance such as this,
where there could be no economic gain, than in a situation where the possibility of such gain
existed. Id.
47. Id. at 652.
48. Id. at 649-52. The Court also held that in determining custody, trial courts must
apply the same standard for unwed fathers, unwed mothers and married parents. Id.
49. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (Harrison 1975) (providing in pertinent part that "ille-
gitimate children-if the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice").
51. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
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ter the child had been living with his mother and her husband for about
nine years. 2 The child's biological father, Leon Quilloin, had notice of
the adoption petition and participated in a hearing in which he asked
that he be declared the child's legitimate father, that he be granted visita-
tion rights, and that the court deny the adoption by the mother's hus-
band, Randall Walcott.
5 3
Although the child, Darrell, had never been abandoned or deprived
of anything, Leon Quilloin had provided support only on an irregular
basis54 and had not taken steps to support or legitimate5" the child over
more than eleven years. 6 The Court in Quilloin noted that unlike the
biological father in Stanley, the biological father in Quilloin had never
been a de facto member of the child's family unit The Court rejected
Leon Quilloin's equal protection argument on the ground that his inter-
ests were "readily distinguishable" from those of a father who had been
married to the mother and divorced, stating that Leon had "never exer-
cised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus ha[d] never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily super-
vision, education, protection, or care of the child."58 Thus, the Court
used Quilloin to limit its holding in Stanley.
52. Id. at 247.
53. Id. at 249-50.
54. Id. at 25 1. As the biological father, Leon Quilloin had a statutory duty to support his
child, but for reasons which were not discussed in the Court's opinion, the mother never
brought an action to enforce this duty. Id. n.9. However, Darrell had visited Leon on many
occasions, and Leon had given Darrell toys and gifts "from time to time." Id. at 251.
55. Georgia law provided that a child born in wedlock could not be adopted without both
parents' consent, unless the parent had either voluntarily surrendered rights in the child or had
been adjudicated to be an unfit parent. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1), (2) (Harrison 1975).
Even if the child's parents were divorced or separated at the time of the adoption proceedings,
either parent still retained veto power. However, only the consent of the mother was required
for adoption of an illegimate child. Id. § 74-403(3).
In order to obtain the same veto authority other parents automatically possess, the father
of a child born out of wedlock had to legitimate his children in either one of two ways. He
could either marry the mother and acknowledge the child as his own, id. § 74-101, or obtain a
court order declaring the child legitimate and capable of inheriting from him, id. § 74-103.
Unless the father legitimated the child, the mother was the only recognized parent and was
given sole authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, including the power to veto adoption
of the child. Id. § 74-203.
56. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249. The mother had recently decided that Leon's visits with
Darrell were having unhealthy and disruptive effects on both Darrell and her other son, who
was born several years after she and Walcott were married. Id. at 251. Although Darrell
wanted to be adopted by Walcott, he also wanted to continue his visits with Leon after his
adoption. Id. n.11.
57. Id. at 253. Peter Stanley, the biological father in Stanley, had lived with his children
and their mother "intermittently" for more than eighteen years. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
58. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253.
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Only a little more than a year after its decision in Quilloin, the
Supreme Court, in Caban v. Mohammed,5 9 invalidated a New York stat-
ute similar to the statute it had previously upheld in the Quilloin case.o
The New York statute, like the Georgia statute at issue in Quilloin, pro-
vided that an illegitimate child could be adopted if the mother alone con-
sented; the consent of the father was not required.61
The two children involved in Caban were born when their parents,
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed, were living together; Caban and
Mohammed represented themselves as husband and wife although they
were never legally married.62 Caban lived with the children and Moham-
med until Mohammed took the children and left him to move in with
another man, Kazim Mohammed, whom she later married.63 Caban was
able to see the children each week when Mohammed brought them to
visit her mother." However, following a custody dispute with Caban
and his new wife,6" Mohammed and her husband filed an adoption peti-
tion pursuant to a New York statute.6 In response, the Cabans filed a
cross-petition for adoption.67 After a hearing, the trial court approved
59. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
60. Id. at 393-94. At the time of the decision, section 111 of the New York Domestic
Relations Law provided in pertinent part that "consent to adoption shall be required as follows
... (a) Of the parents or surviving parents whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock;
[and] (c) of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock." N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977). The relevant section of the Georgia Annotated Code,
§ 74-403(3), provided that, as to adoption, "[i]f the child be illegitimate, the consent of the
mother shall suffice." GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3).
61. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1).
62. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382. In fact, throughout the time the couple was living together,
Abdiel Caban was married to another woman. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Mohammed's mother, Delores Gonzales, lived one floor above Caban, and when
Mohammed moved out, Gonzales and Caban remained on friendly terms. Id. When Moham-
med brought the children to see their grandmother, Gonzales allowed Caban to see them. Id.
65. Id. Gonzales, the children's grandmother, moved to Puerto Rico, and at their
mother's request, she took the children with her. According to the Mohammeds, they planned
to join the children in Puerto Rico as soon as they had saved enough money to move there and
start a business. Id. Caban eventually went to Puerto Rico, where the children's grandmother
gave the children to him, believing that Caban would return them in a few days. However,
Caban took the children and went back to New York. Id.
When the children's mother found out they were with Caban, she attempted to get them
back from him. When her efforts failed, she and her husband instituted custody proceedings in
the New York Family Court. Id. That court placed the children in the temporary custody of
the Mohammeds and gave Caban and his new wife, Nina, visiting privileges. Id.
66. Id. at 383. The statute stated, "An adult or minor husband and his adult or minor
wife together may adopt a child of either of them born in or out of wedlock and an adult or
minor husband or an adult or minor wife may adopt such a child of the other spouse." N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1977).
67. Caban, 441 U.S. at 383.
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the adoption by Mohammed and her husband,68 and Caban appealed.69
The Supreme Court held that the distinction made by the New York
statute between the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 70  The
Court rejected the argument that the statute could be justified as promot-
ing the state's interest in providing for the adoption of illegitimate chil-
dren, on the ground that the statute bore no reasonable relation to that
interest.71 However, the three dissenters in Caban were prepared to "as-
sume that, if and when one develops, the relationship between a father
and his natural child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state ac-
tion as a matter of due process. "72
In Lehr v. Robertson,73 the Supreme Court addressed the amended
version of the New York statute at issue in Caban, including its provision
for notice of adoption to fathers of illegitimate children.74 The statute
provided that mothers of illegitimate children must notify the father of
pending adoption proceedings if the father has filed a notice of intent to
68. Id. at 383-84. The hearing on the petition and cross-petition was held before a law
assistant to a New York Surrogate. Id. at 383. The surrogate granted the Mohammeds' peti-
tion to adopt the children and cut off all of Caban's parental rights and obligations, pursuant to
section 117 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKin-
ney 1977). Caban, 441 U.S. at 383-84. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
affirmed. Id. at 384.
Section 117 of the New York Domestic Relations Law provided, in pertinent part, "[a]fter
the making of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of
all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights over such
adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession, except as hereinafter stated." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 117.
69. Caban, 441 U.S. at 385. In his appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Caban
made two claims. First, he argued that the distinction drawn by New York law between the
adoption rights of an unwed father and those of other parents violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. His second argument was that the Court's previous deci-
sion in Quilloin v. Walcott recognized that natural fathers have a due process right to maintain
a parental relationship with their children where there has been no finding of parental unfit-
ness. Id.
70. Id. at 394. The Court explained that the gender-based classification in section 111 was
overbroad. By classifying unwed fathers as being less qualified than mothers to exercise judg-
ment concerning their children's lives, the statute excluded some loving fathers from partici-
pating in the decision as to whether their children would be adopted. Id. At the same time,
section 111 also enabled some alienated mothers to arbitrarily cut off the father's parental
rights. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
joined in dissent).
73. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
74. Id. at 251; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a 2(c) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983).
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claim paternity of the child in the state's putative father registry.7"
The child in Lehr, Jessica M., was born out of wedlock.76 Eight
months after the child's birth, her mother, Lorraine, married Richard
Robertson, who was not Jessica's biological father.77 When Jessica was
two years old, Richard filed a petition to adopt her.78 Jessica's biological
father, Jonathan Lehr, had not supported, lived with, nor cared for Jes-
sica since her birth,7 9 and until Richard filed the adoption petition,
Jonathan had also failed to file any notice of intent to claim paternity
pursuant to the statute.8
Shortly after Richard filed the adoption petition, Jonathan ified a
petition in a different New York court claiming paternity and seeking
visitation rights.81 The adoption was granted without notice to
Jonathan,82 and he petitioned to the United States Supreme Court, alleg-
ing that he had been deprived of both due process83 and equal protec-
tion84 by the state court's decision. 5
The Supreme Court in Lehr held that the biological father's due
process rights had not been violated by the state's failure to give notice to
75. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a 2(c). The registry of such notices was provided for by
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
76. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 252. Lehr had lived with Lorraine prior to Jessica's birth and had visited her in
the hospital when Jessica was born. Id. However, he was not named on Jessica's birth certifi-
cate. Id. Furthermore, he did not live with Lorraine or Jessica after Jessica's birth, he never
provided them with any financial support, and he never offered to marry Lorraine. Id.
80. Id. at 251.
81. Jessica's mother and her husband, Richard, filed the adoption petition in the Family
Court of Ulster County, N.Y. Id. at 250. Jonathan, the biological father, fied the paternity
and visitation rights petition in Westchester County, N.Y., one month later. Id. at 252.
82. Id. at 253. Jonathan found out about the adoption proceedings when he received a
change of venue order concerning his paternity suit. Id. When his attorney attempted to have
the adoption proceedings stayed, the judge informed the attorney that he had already signed
the adoption order earlier that same day. Id. Because Jonathan had not filed a notice of intent
to claim paternity, the judge believed that Jonathan did not fall within the statutory classifica-
tion of putative fathers to whom notice must be given. Id. Therefore, Jonathan never received
notice of the adoption proceeding. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. Id.
85. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253-55. Jonathan asserted that his due process rights had been vio-
lated because he had a liberty interest, as a putative father, in his actual or potential relation-
ship with his child. Id. at 255. He argued that this interest was destroyed without due process
of law when he was deprived of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard before the state
granted the mother's adoption. Id. Jonathan also claimed that the gender-based classification
of the New York statute, which both denied him the right to consent to his illegitimate child's
adoption and granted him fewer procedural rights than it granted to the child's mother, vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 255.
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the father before the adoption proceeding.86 The Court reasoned that the
mere biological relationship between father and child did not warrant the
same constitutional protection as a father-child relationship in which the
father had cared for, supported, and associated with the child.8 7
The Court contrasted the developed father-child relationships impli-
cated in Stanley and Caban, with the potential father-child relationship
involved in Quilloin and this case.88 The Court in Lehr stated that when
an unwed father demonstrates his commitment to his parental responsi-
bilities by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,"8 9
his interest in establishing a relationship and maintaining contact with
his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.
It is then that he has acted "'as a father toward his children.' "90 How-
ever, "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection."91 The Court stated:
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the
instruction of children... as well as from the fact of blood
relationship.92
The Court held that the New York statute categorizing fathers and dif-
ferentiating between those who filed a notice of intent to claim paternity
and those who did not, provided an adequate method for determining
those fathers who have developed an emotional as distinguished from a
merely biological relationship with their children.93 For this reason, the
Court approved the statute's notice provision.94
The Court also held that the Equal Protection Clause was not vio-
lated in this case because the mother and biological father, Lorraine and
Jonathan, were not similarly situated, and therefore the statute could
make a valid distinction between them. 95 They were not similarly situ-
ated because Lorraine had had custody of the child and had cared for her
86. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265.
87. Id. at 261.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
90. Id. (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 n.7 (1979)).
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quote cited as appearing in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33
(1972)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 264-66.
95. Id. at 267.
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while Jonathan had never had a custodial, personal, or financial relation-
ship with Jessica.96 The Court stated that "the existence or nonexistence
of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant crite-
rion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of
the child."
97
The biological father in Lehr, like the father in Quilloin, "had never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily super-
vision, education, protection, or care of the child."98 Therefore, the
Court held that the biological father in Lehr had never established a sub-
stantial relationship with his daughter, and thus the New York statute
did not deny him equal protection.99 The Court explained that if one
parent had an established custodial relationship with the child and the
other parent had either abandoned or never established a relationship
with the child, the Equal Protection Clause would not prevent a state
from according the two parents different legal rights."0
The Court in Lehr discussed the importance of the biological rela-
tionship that is developed between a parent and his or her biological
child, and said that the state may not deny biological parents the oppor-
tunity to establish a protected custodial relationship. 10 The biological
connection between parent and child affords an opportunity interest to
the biological father, because "it offers the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his off-
spring. ' 1° 2 However, the Constitution will only protect the biological
father's interest if the biological father "grasp[s] that opportunity" and
accepts his parental responsibilities.1
0 3
These Supreme Court cases established the rights of unwed fathers,
by recognizing that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses pro-
tect the father's parental right to develop and maintain a relationship
with his children, so long as the father has demonstrated his willingness
to "act as a father toward his children."'" 4 As one commentator has
written:
[I]f an unwed biological father is willing and able to perform
those functions that society has always deemed critical for the
96. Id.
97. Id. at 266-67.
98. Id. at 267.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 267-68.
101. Id. at 262-63.
102. Id. at 262.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 n. 7 (1979)).
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protection and development of children, the Constitution re-
quires the state to allow him to do so initially and to continue
doing so, in the absence of circumstances not of the state's own
making.
10 5
C. California Cases Challenging the Conclusive Presumption of
Legitimacy Establish a Balancing of the Interests Test
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 10o was not the first challenge to California's
conclusive presumption of legitimacy.107 In In re Lisa R., 10 decided by
the California Supreme Court in 1975, the court adopted a case-by-case
balancing test for reviewing constitutional challenges to the conclusive
presumption of legitimacy' °9 The test weighed the state's interest in up-
holding the presumption against the competing private interests in rebut-
ting it.110
Although the balancing test that was developed in Lisa R. resulted
in a successful rebuttal of the conclusive presumption in that case, two
other California cases mandated application of the presumption because
the state's interests outweighed those of the putative father. In both Es-
tate of Cornelious111 and Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 211 California courts
weighed the interests of the parties against those of the state, found the
state's interests stronger, and applied the conclusive presumption.
1 13
1. In re Lisa R.
In Lisa R., the California court adjudged two-year-old Lisa a depen-
dent ward of the court 1 4 under section 600(a) of the California Welfare
105. Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After
Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 382 (1984).
106. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), afftg 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
107. See, eg., Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d 461, 674 P.2d 245, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984);
In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975). For a list of some of
the commentators who have debated and criticized the application of the conclusive presump-
tion in California, see supra note 8.
108. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
109. Id. at 648, 532 P.2d at 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
110. Id.
111. 35 Cal. 3d 461, 674 P.2d 245, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984).
112. 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985).
113. Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d at 360, 703 P.2d at 91, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 750-51; Cornelious,
35 Cal. 3d at 467, 674 P.2d at 249, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
114. 13 Cal. 3d at 640, 532 P.2d at 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The petition seeking a
dependency determination for Lisa stated that Lisa's mother had been found in her home
along with Lisa and another minor child. Id. Lisa's mother was intoxicated and the home was
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and Institutions Code;11 her mother was an alcoholic and her mother's
husband was a drug addict." 6 After having been adjudged a dependent,
Lisa lived with several foster families until she was five years old.117 By
this time, both her mother and father were dead. 1 8 Victor R. stepped in,
claimed to be Lisa's biological father, and sought to prove his pater-
nity.119 The trial court applied the conclusive presumption, found that
filled with gas. Id. The petition also noted that Lisa's mother had been intoxicated on numer-
ous occasions in Lisa's presence during a six-month period. Id.
A probation officer's report supported the petition. Id. The report claimed that Lisa's
mother had pleaded guilty to a child-neglect charge and was on probation at the time, and that
her husband had a record of narcotic violations and was in custody. Id. Lisa's mother had
told the probation officer that Lisa was conceived during a casual extra-marital affair while she
was separated from her husband. Id.
At the time of the initiation of the probation officer's investigations, Lisa's mother was
residing in an alcoholic rehabilitation home. Id. She was pregnant, contemplating an abor-
tion, and had been asked to leave the home. By the time the report was filed, she had been
incarcerated in the county jail for drunkenness. Id.
115. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600(a) (West 1973) (current version at CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991)). Section 600 provided in pertinent part:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descrip-
tions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person
to be a dependent child of the court.
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has no
parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of
exercising such care or control, or has no parent or guardian actually exercising such
care or control.
Id.
116. Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d at 640, 532 P.2d at 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
117. Id. at 640-41, 532 P.2d at 125-26, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. Lisa's status as a depen-
dent child was reviewed annually. At the time of Lisa's second annual review, she had been
living at a foster home, and her foster parents had expressed their desire to adopt her. Id. at
641, 532 P. 2d at 125-26, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. However, Lisa's mother had not given her
consent for the adoption. Id.
At the fourth anmal review, the probation officer's report identified Victor R. as "Lisa's
Putative Father," who had commenced proceedings to have Lisa placed in his custody. Id. at
641, 532 P.2d at 126, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
118. Id. at 641-42, 532 P.2d at 125-26, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. At the second annual
review of Lisa's dependency status, a probation officer's report stated that Lisa's mother's
husband, who had been identified as Lisa's "legal father," had died as a result of a drug over-
dose. Id. at 641, 532 P.2d at 125-26, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. The report also identified
Victor R. as the "father" of Lisa. Id. At the fourth annual review of Lisa's status, the proba-
tion officer reported that Lisa's mother had died shortly before the hearing date. Id. at 641-42,
532 P.2d at 126, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
119. Id. at 641, 532 P.2d at 126, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 478. Victor had only seen Lisa five times
in the previous five years, and he had had no visits with her during the past two. Id. The
reason Victor gave for his lack of visits was that he had believed he was not allowed to visit
Lisa. Id.
The information provided to the court stated that Victor had been confined to a state
hospital for emotional problems twice; that a physician had concluded that he suffered from
conditions from which cure was doubtful without "good intensive psychiatric care;" and that a
case worker, in response to Victor's application for aid to the totally disabled, had reported
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Lisa was the legitimate issue of the marriage of her mother and presumed
father, and denied Victor R. the opportunity to establish his paternity.
12 0
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that
there was no intact family present in this case. 121 Because there was no
intact family to protect, the court focused on the interests of the putative
father, paying particular attention to: (1) the type of relationship Victor
had had with Lisa's mother; (2) the fact that Victor had asserted his
rights immediately when he discovered that Lisa was a dependent ward
of the court; and (3) the otherwise harsh result that would occur because
Victor had no alternative remedy through which to protect his
interests. 
122
Then, the court discussed the state's potential interests: (1) carrying
out the purposes of the juvenile court's laws; (2) relieving a child of the
stigma of illegitimacy; (3) promoting marriage; and (4) promoting speed
and efficiency of judicial inquiries. 123 When the court balanced the puta-
tive father's interests against those of the state, the court found that
Victor's interests in establishing his relationship with Lisa outweighed
the state's interests.1 24 Thus, the court held that the presumption which
precluded him from offering evidence to prove that he was the child's
father was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and a denial of due
process. 1
25
2. Estate of Cornelious
In Cornelious, a female adult claimed to be the decedent's illegiti-
mate daughter and petitioned the court to be appointed as administratrix
of his estate.' 26 The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
application of the conclusive presumption and denial of her request. 127
The court held that the woman's interest in proving that the decedent
was her biological father did not outweigh the state's interest in prevent-
ing her from rebutting the presumption.128 The court reasoned that the
woman's only interest in claiming to be the decedent's daughter was fi-
that Victor's conduct had been deemed by his common-law wife to endanger the lives of
Victor, his common-law wife, and her four-year-old daughter whom Victor had previously
abused. Id. at 641-42, 532 P.2d at 126, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
120. 41 Cal. App. 3d 89, 115 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1974).
'121. Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d at 639, 532 P.2d at 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
122. Id. at 649, 532 P.2d at 131-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84.
123. Id. at 650-51, 532 P.2d at 132-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
124. Id. at 649-51, 532 P.2d at 132-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
125. Id. at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
126. Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d at 463, 674 P.2d at 247, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
127. Id. at 467-68, 674 P.2d at 249, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
128. Id. at 467, 674 P.2d at 249, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
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nancial; she hoped to gain a right to inherit. 12 9 There was no possibility
of developing a relationship with the biological father, since he was de-
ceased.130 On the other hand, the state's interest was substantial because
the policies promoted by the conclusive presumption of legitimacy were
served by the application of the presumption.1 3' The woman had been
raised and supported by her presumed father who had previously died,
believing that he was her biological father.'32
Cornelious demonstrates the strength of the state's interest in pro-
tecting and preserving the integrity of the family. The presumed father
was dead, so the family unit no longer existed. Nevertheless, the court
determined that the family the presumed father had established while
alive was of sufficient and significant interest to warrant applying the
conclusive presumption.
133
3. Michelle W. v. Ronald W.
In Michelle W., Michelle and her stepfather, Donald, brought an
action to prove that Donald was Michelle's biological father.' Michelle
was born while her mother was married to Ronald, but the marriage was
dissolved when Michelle was five years old.' 35 Neither party raised the
issue of paternity in the dissolution. Ronald agreed to pay child support,
and he visited Michelle regularly after the marriage ended.'36
However, when Michelle was six years old, her mother married
Donald and refused to allow Ronald to continue his visits with
Michelle.' 37 One year later, Donald and Michelle brought an action to
establish Donald's paternity.'38 The trial court applied the presumption
of section 621 because the facts established that Ronald had lived with
Michelle's mother for nine years before Michelle's birth, and Ronald was
neither impotent nor sterile. As a result, the court held that Ronald was
conclusively presumed to be Michelle's father.'39
On appeal, the California Supreme Court, in affirming the trial
court's ruling that the presumption should apply, balanced Michelle's
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d at 359, 703 P.2d at 90, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
135. Id. at 358-59, 703 P.2d at 90, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
136. Id. at 359, 703 P.2d at 90, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
November 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
and Donald's private interests against the state's interests. 140 The court
found that the public interest in protecting the family unit substantially
outweighed Michelle's and Donald's private interests. 141 The court also
noted that unlike the putative father in Lisa R., Donald was not attempt-
ing to establish a legal relationship with a child who otherwise had no
parents.142 Accordingly, the court ruled that the state's interest in up-
holding the integrity of the family and protecting the child's welfare out-
weighed Donald's interests.1 43 Even though the original family unit of
Ronald, Michelle and her mother no longer existed, the court concluded
that application of the presumption furthered the state's policy of up-
holding the integrity of the family.
III. MICHAEL H. v GERALD D.: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S MOST RECENT GUIDANCE
4. The Facts
On May 9, 1976, Carole D. and Gerald D. were married; subse-
quently, they established a home in California."4 During the summer of
1978, Carole and a neighbor, Michael H., began an adulterous affair; in
September 1980, Carole conceived a child, and on May 11, 1981, Victo-
ria was born. 145 Shortly after the child's birth, Carole told Michael that
she thought he might be Victoria's father.1 4 6 Gerald's name, however,
was listed on the birth certificate as Victoria's father, and he always held
her out to the world as his child. 47
Gerald and Carole separated in October 1981.114 On October 29,
1981, Carole, Michael and Victoria took blood tests which showed a
98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's biological father.'4 9 In
January 1982, Carole and Victoria went to live on the island of St.
Thomas with Michael."' 0 The three lived together for three months, dur-
140. Id. at 360, 703 P.2d at 91, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
141. Id. at 360, 363, 703 P.2d at 91, 93, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 751, 753.
142. Id. at 362, 703 P.2d at 92, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
143. Id.
144. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989), afftg 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236
Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987). Both Gerald and Carole traveled a great deal; Carole was an interna-
tional model and Gerald was an oil company executive. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 114.
147. Id. at 113-14.
148. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1000, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 813 (1987),
aff'd, 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1000-01.
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ing which time Michael held Victoria out as his child."' In March, Car-
ole left Michael and went back to California, where she resided with still
another man, Scott K.'52 Later in the spring of 1982, and again in the
summer of the same year, Carole and Victoria visited Gerald in New
York City.' 53 The three even vacationed together in Europe in the fall of
1982, but Carole and Victoria then returned to live with Scott in
California. 5 4
In November 1982, Michael filed a filiation' 55 action in a California
superior court to establish his paternity and riht to visitation after Car-
ole denied his request for visitation.' 56 In March 1983, the court ap-
pointed an attorney and guardian ad litem 'I to represent Victoria's
interests. Victoria's attorney and guardian ad litem then filed a cross-
complaint which asserted that if Victoria had more than one psychologi-
cal or defacto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship
with both.
158
From March 1983 through July 1983, Carole and Victoria lived
with Gerald in New York, 5 9 but in August, Carole and Victoria re-
turned to California and once again took up residence with Michael.'"
Carole then removed her summary judgment motion from the calen-
dar.' 6 ' From August 1983 through April 1984, Carole, Victoria and
Michael lived together in California. x62 Michael held Victoria out as his
daughter,' 63 and she called him "Daddy."' ' 14 In April 1984, Carole and
Michael signed a stipulation which stated that Michael was Victoria's
biological father;' 65 however, the next month Carole left Michael and
151. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. A filiation action is an action brought for the purpose of establishing parentage.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 628 (6th ed. 1990).
156. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114. Michael filed this action because Carole had not permit-
ted him to see Victoria. Id.
157. A guardian ad litem is one who is appointed to prosecute or defend a suit on behalf of
a party who lacks the capacity to protect his or her own interests. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
43 (6th ed. 1990).
158. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Michael still maintained his apartment in St. Thomas, but when he was in Los
Angeles he lived with Carole and Victoria in Carole's apartment. Id.
163. Id.
164. Michael H., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
165. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114-15.
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told her attorneys not to file the stipulation. 66
In May 1984, Victoria's guardian ad litem/attorney and Michael
sought visitation rights for Michaelpendente lite. 67 To assist the court
in determining whether visitation would be in Victoria's best interests,
the court appointed a psychologist to evaluate Michael, Victoria, Carole
and Gerald.
1 68
In his report, the psychologist recommended that Carole retain sole
custody,1 69 but that Michael be permitted to remain "a member of [Vic-
toria's] family," because he perceived Michael "as the single adult in Vic-
toria's life most committed to caring for her needs on a long-term
basis." 7 The psychologist recommended that Michael be allowed con-
tinued contact with Victoria pursuant to a restricted visitation sched-
ule. 1 71 The court agreed and ordered that Michael be provided with
limited visitation privileges pendente lite.172 In the meantime, however,
in June 1984, Carole and Gerald again reconciled in New York.173
B. Reasoning of the Plurality
The United States Supreme Court did not issue a majority opinion
in the Michael H. case. 74 Five Justices agreed to reject Michael's claim
that he had "a constitutionally protected liberty interest" in his relation-
ship with Victoria.175 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, stated that
166. Id. at 115.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Michael H., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
171. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 115.
172. Id.
173. Id. They were still living together in New York with Victoria and two other children
since born into their marriage at the time this case was heard before the United States Supreme
Court. Id.
174. Justice Scalia affirmed the California court's rulings in an opinion that only Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined in full. Id. at 132. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in all of the
plurality's opinion except for a lengthy footnote in which Justice Scalia put forth a strict test
for determining when the Court will recognize traditional interests protected by the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 127-28 n.6. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence in which Justice Ken-
nedy joined. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 123-24; id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's opinion relied on
his interpretation of substantive due process. In two separate dissents-one written by Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, and the other written by Justice White,
joined by Justice Brennan-four Justices agreed that Michael had a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in his relationship with Victoria and was entitled at least to a hearing at which
he could prove his paternity. Id. at 136-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 157-63 (White, J.,
dissenting). All the dissenters agreed that a law which does not provide a man with an oppor-
tunity to establish his paternity in court has violated that man's liberty interest. Id.
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Michael was seeking a declaration that he was the father of Victoria, and
the immediate benefit he sought to obtain from such a declaration was
visitation rights.176 However, in Justice Scalia's view, if the Court de-
clared that Michael was Victoria's father, other rights, such as the right
to be considered the custodial parent, would necessarily follow. 177 By
denying Michael status as the father, all parental rights, including visita-
tion rights, were automatically denied.
171
Michael raised two related challenges to the constitutionality of sec-
tion 621 of the California Evidence Code,179 which denied putative fa-
thers the right to establish paternity unless the child's mother agreed.'8 0
First, he asserted that requirements of procedural due process prevented
the state of California from terminating his substantive due process lib-
erty interest in his relationship with Victoria without affording him an
opportunity to demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing.'
Justice Scalia responded to this claim by stating:
We believe this claim derives from a fundamental misconcep-
tion of the nature of the California statute. While [section] 621
is phrased in terms of a presumption, that rule of evidence is
the implementation of a substantive rule of law. California de-
clares it to be, except in limited circumstances, irrelevant for
paternity purposes whether a child conceived during and born
into an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than
the husband and had a prior relationship with him.'
82
According to Justice Scalia, the conclusive presumption of section 621
not only expresses the state's substantive policy, but also furthers it by
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 119. Although section 4601 of the California Civil Code, CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 4601 (West Supp. 1991), gives the court discretion to award visitation rights to a nonparent,
the superior court, affirmed by the court of appeal, held that California law denies visitation to
a putative father who has been prevented by section 621 of the California Evidence Code, CAL.
EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1991), from establishing his paternity, unless the mother
agrees that the putative father should have visitation. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115-16.
179. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621.
180. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119.
181. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause states that no person shall be
deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV,
§ 1.
182. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 119. Justice Scalia went on to quote from the court of appeal:
The conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law based upon a
determination by the Legislature as a matter of overriding social policy, that given a
certain relationship between the husband and wife, the husband is to be held respon-
sible for the child, and that the integrity of the family unit should not be impugned.
Id. at 119-20 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005, 236 Cal. Rptr.
810, 816 (1987), aff'd, 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
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excluding inquiries into the child's paternity that might destroy family
integrity and privacy." 3
Michael based his second argument on his substantive due process
liberty interests.184 He contended that he had a due process liberty inter-
est in his parental relationship with Victoria, and protecting Gerald's and
Carole's marriage was not a sufficiently strong state interest to support
termination of his constitutionally protected father-daughter relationship
with Victoria.185 Justice Scalia noted that Michael's assumption that he
had a liberty interest in his relationship with Victoria was erroneous.'
8 6
Justice Scalia determined that such a constitutionally protected liberty
interest did not exist and therefore Michael's substantive due process ar-
gument failed.
18 7
Justice Scalia limited his opinion, however, to cases in which the
husband and wife wish to raise the wife's child together.1 88 His limita-
tion to the specific facts of Michael H. was because "it is at least possible
that our traditions lead to a different conclusion with regard to adulter-
ous fathering of a child whom the marital parents do not wish to raise as
their own. '
Thus, Justice Scalia left the door open for courts to avoid applying
the conclusive presumption when the family is no longer intact, that is, in
cases in which the husband and wife are no longer together or do not
wish to raise the wife's child jointly. Although the plurality found that
section 621 was constitutional in the circumstances presented in Michael
H., the plurality did not address the issue of whether the presumption
might be unfair to a putative father or child in other circumstances. Ger-
ald and Carole together represented an intact family, and since the state's
strongest interest has always been to protect intact families, the presump-
tion was used to uphold the integrity of this family. 190
183. Id. at 120.
184. Id. at 121. Substantive due process arguments are based upon rights found in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. For a discussion of substantive due process, see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, CONsTrruTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to -21 (2d ed. 1988).
185. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 121-30.
188. Id. at 129. Justice Scalia distinguished any substantive constitutional claims that
otherwise might exist in a case such as this. He limited his opinion to the circumstances
presented-that is, "that the mother is, at the time of the child's conception and birth, married
to and cohabiting with another man, both of whom wish to raise the child as the offspring of
their union." Id.
189. Id. at 129 n.7.
190. If Carole had decided to leave Gerald and marry Michael instead, there would have
been no pre-existing family to protect, and Justice Scalia's reasoning would not have applied.
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IV. THE AFrERMATH OF MICHAEL H. IN CALIFORNIA
A. California Cases after Michael H.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,91 the United States Supreme Court ap-
peared to require application of California's conclusive presumption of
legitimacy, to foreclose a putative father from establishing or maintaining
a previously established relationship with his child when that child was
already part of an existing family. However, none of the cases which
have come before the California courts and raised the presumption subse-
quent to the Michael H. decision have applied the presumption. 192 In
each of these cases in which the California courts have refused to apply
the presumption, there was no intact family to protect, as there was in
Michael H.
In In re Melissa G. ,19 the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District
held that the trial court's application of section 621 was unconstitutional,
because application of the conclusive presumption would not serve the
interests it was intended to protect in light of the specific facts
presented. 194 If the conclusive presumption had been applied, the child,
Melissa, would have had to live with a man with whom she had never
lived, 95 and would have been separated from her sister, with whom she
had lived and had developed a strong attachment. 96 In the even more
unusual case of Szwed v. Headrick (In re Guardianship of Szwed),'97 the
court of appeal held that a woman's former husband was estopped from
using section 621 to assert paternity. 98 This case was unusual because
the former husband was estopped based on his previous assertion of an-
other man's paternity, not his own.
1. In re Melissa G.
During the marriage of Rita D. and Fermin G., four children were
In that case, it is possible that the Court might have allowed Michael to attempt to rebut the
presumption.
191. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), aff'g 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
192. Szwed v. Headrick (In re Guardianship of Szwed), 221 Cal. App. 3d 1403, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 121 (1990); In re Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1989); see also
Leslie v. Superior Court (Madsen), 228 Cal. App. 3d 556, 279 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1991) (allowing
putative father to bring paternity action because evidence did not show that mother was mar-
ried to and cohabiting with presumptive natural father at time of child's possible conceation,
thereby making conclusive presumption of legitimacy inapplicable).
193. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894-(1989).
194. Id. at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1403, 271 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1990).
198. Id. at 1415-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 129-30.
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born-Lenora, Eugene, James and Melissa. 199 Melissa, the youngest,
was born in August 1983, only eight days before Rita and Fermin sepa-
rated.2°° Although Rita had told a social worker that another man, Fe-
lix, was Melissa's father, Rita had listed Fermin as the father on
Melissa's birth certificate, and had named Fermin as the father of Me-
lissa in their divorce.2°'
In December 1983, Rita and Felix began living together.20  They
married in August 1984, and Shannon, their daughter, was born in Feb-
ruary 1985.203 Melissa lived with Rita and Felix and the four other chil-
dren between August 1983 and July 1987.20 Rita was arrested several
times during this period, and each time she spent two or three days in
jail.2" 5 Felix took care of Melissa when Rita was in jail.206 Fermin never
visited Melissa, although he did visit the three older children.20 7 In July
1987, Felix was arrested for spousal abuse.20 8 Several months later Rita
was hospitalized,2 "o and in November 1987 the children were found liv-
ing in "an abandoned truck trailer, without adult supervision ... [or]
heat, cooking or sanitary facilities.
'" 210
The court took all five children into protective custody, and gave
Fermin custody of Lenora, James and Eugene.211 Melissa and Shannon
were placed together in the same foster home.21 2 In order to determine
Melissa's paternity, the court ordered blood tests; these blood tests re-
vealed a 99.1% probability that Felix was Melissa's biological father.213
In its decision, which cited Michael H. v. Gerald D.,214 the court con-
cluded that it must apply section 621 and could not consider the blood
test results.215 Therefore, the court determined that Fermin was Me-
199. Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1084, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95.
200. Id. at 1084, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. The court suggested that Rita's arrests were related to her alcohol abuse. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. During several hearings, a California superior court heard evidence on the rela-
tionships between Fermin, Felix and Melissa. Id. at 1085, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895. Fermin
argued that the court should apply § 621 and disregard the blood test results. Id.
214. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), aff'g 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
215. Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1085, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
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lissa's father.216
When this case reached the California Supreme Court, the court re-
viewed several appellate court decisions which had previously considered
the constitutionality of section 621.217 The court also examined the
United States Supreme Court decisions in Michael H. v. Gerald D.218 and
Stanley v. Illinois.219 The California Supreme Court held that the appli-
cation of California's conclusive presumption of legitimacy codified in
section 621 was unconstitutional in Melissa G.220
In its analysis, the court distinguished Michael H. It pointed out
that the United States Supreme Court's holding in that case was limited
to situations in which a wife and husband were living together and
wished to raise the child jointly.221 The Melissa G. court emphasized
that in Michael H., Justice Scalia had left open the possibility that when
there was no longer an intact family unit to protect, a putative father
may have a constitutionally protected interest in a relationship with his
child.222 The Melissa G. court found no family unit to protect regarding
the Fermin-Melissa parental relationship, because the marriage between
Rita and Fermin had ended eight days after Melissa was born.223 Fur-
thermore, Rita and Felix had raised Melissa and Shannon until the time
the children became dependents of the court.224 The court noted, "[t]he
'categorical preference' for an extant marital union which Justice Scalia
recognized, in Michael H., as being expressed by the statute, thus has no
application to this case."
'221
The Melissa G. court also found that Felix had a stronger interest in
a paternal relationship with Melissa than Michael H. had had with Vic-
toria.226 Specifically, the court noted that Felix had lived with Melissa
216. Id. In an appeal, Melissa, Felix and the Department of Social Services asked the court
to reverse the trial court's order, while Fermin urged the appellate court to uphold the lower
court's presumption of his paternity of Melissa. Id.
217. See id. at 1085-87, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96 (discussing Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39
Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985); Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d 461, 674
P.2d 245, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984); In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 475 (1975)).
218. For a discussion of Michael H., see supra notes 144-90 and accompanying text.
219. See Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1086-87, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 896. For a discussion
of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), see supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
220. 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
221. Id. at 1088, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
222. Id.; see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129.
223. Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1088-89, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
226. Id.
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for almost four years, beginning shortly after her birth.2 27 On the other
hand, Michael H. had lived with Victoria for a total of only eleven non-
consecutive months. Thus, the Melissa G. court determined that no real
state interest in protecting the "family" of Fermin and Melissa existed,
and in addition, the court found Felix's interests significant.
The court then considered the child's interests. It recognized that
Melissa and her younger sister Shannon were "emotionally and psycho-
logically bonded to each other, and that it would be detrimental to sepa-
rate them." '228 Had the court applied the statutory presumption, Fermin
would have been conclusively presumed to be Melissa's father, and Me-
lissa would have been placed in Fermin's custody-while Felix would
have had no chance of obtaining custody.229 Therefore, application of
the presumption would have resulted in the sisters' separation.
Although the court did not address whether Melissa's right to a sib-
ling relationship rose to constitutional dimensions, it assumed that the
public interest in Melissa's welfare encompassed her sibling relationship
with Shannon.230 It found that in light of this public interest, as well as
Felix's private interest in establishing his parental relationship with Me-
lissa, the balancing test mandated by the California Supreme Court in
pre-Michael H. cases231 weighed in favor of Felix and against applying
the presumption.232
The Melissa G. court noted that in Michael H., Justice Scalia had
explained, "irrebutable presumption cases ultimately call into question
not the adequacy of procedures but 'the adequacy of the 'fit' between the
classification and the policy that the classification serves.' ,,233 In Melissa
227. Id.
228. Id. However, Felix was the only father Melissa had ever known. Id. Shannon, on the
other hand, would be placed in Felix's custody but not in that of Fermin, to whom she was
biologically unrelated. Id. If the presumption had been applied, the two girls would be sepa-
rated. Id. The court stated that Melissa had a right to a sibling relationship, which would be
violated if the conclusive presumption was applied. Id.
229. See id.
230. Id. The court stated: "We are not asked to decide, and explicitly, do not hold that
this interest has constitutional dimensions. [W]e need only assume for purposes of this case
that the public interest in Melissa's welfare encompasses her sibling relationship with Shan-
non." Id.
231. See, eg., Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748
(1985); Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d 461, 674 P.2d 245, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984); In re
Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
232. See Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
233. Id. (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989)). "A conclusive pre-
sumption does... foreclose the person against whom it is invoked from demonstrating, in a
particularized proceeding, that applying the presumption to him will in fact not further the
lawful governmental policy the presumption is designed to effectuate." Id. at 120.
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G., the court emphasized the particular facts before it, focusing primarily
on the fact that there was no intact, existing family unit. Melissa had no
available mother, her conclusively presumed father was a stranger to her,
and her most important psychological relationship was with a sibling to
whom she was presumed biologically unrelated, but with whom she had
resided.234 The court concluded that under these facts, the statute would
not serve the interests it was intended to protect.2"' Accordingly, the
court held the application of section 621 unconstitutional, 236 and was
free to consider other interests. In this case, then, because there was no
intact family which warranted protection, the court was able to protect
both Melissa's and Felix's interests by refusing to apply the presumption.
2. Szwed v. Headrick (In re Guardianship of Szwed)
Ethan was born in July 1980 to Maureen Greenwald, who was mar-
ried to and living with Lewis Headrick.2 37 Two older children, Iris, who
was Greenwald's child from a previous relationship, and Ezra Headrick,
also lived in the home.23 8 At the time Greenwald conceived Ethan,
Headrick was traveling and Greenwald was having an extramarital affair
with Wayne Szwed, a friend of Headrick's.23 9 Greenwald was convinced
that Szwed, not Headrick, was the father, and when Ethan was born,
Headrick agreed that Ethan should have Szwed's surname.2 4" Szwed
consented to being designated as Ethan's father on the child's birth cer-
tificate.24 1 Although Ethan lived with Headrick during his early years,
he always called Szwed "Dad" and Headrick "Lewis."242 When Green-
wald and Headrick separated in November 1981, Headrick did not object
to the dissolution petition naming Iris and Ezra, but not Ethan, as chil-
dren of the marriage.243
After the divorce, Ethan stayed with Headrick and the two other
children until 1985.24 During these years, Headrick represented to eve-
ryone, including the county welfare department, that Szwed, not he, was
234. Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1088-89, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
235. Id. at 1089, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
236. Id.
237. Szwed, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1406, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1406-07, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
243. Id. at 1407, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
244. Id. Ethan's mother, Iris Greenwald, had discontinued her contact with Ethan in De-
cember 1981 shortly after her separation from Headrick. She never sought custody of Ethan,
and in 1984 she moved to Australia. Id.
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Ethan's father.245 Szwed remained friends with Headrick and visited
Ethan periodically until March 1985, when Szwed moved Ethan to San
Francisco to live with Szwed and Szwed's friend, Jack Haygood.2 4 6
Ethan lived with Szwed for the next two years, attended school in San
Francisco and formed strong bonds with Szwed's parents, Sy and Sophie
Szwed, whom he considered his grandparents.2 47
In 1985, however, Headrick petitioned for appointment as Ethan's
legal guardian.24 8 In reaction, Szwed filed a complaint seeking sole cus-
tody as Ethan's biological father and a determination that Headrick was
not Ethan's legal father.2 49 Headrick's answer to Szwed's complaint
claimed that he was Ethan's father under section 621 of the California
Evidence Code.210 The court referred the matter to the child-welfare-
services division for an investigation and report.251  The report recom-
mended that Ethan remain with the Szweds, and described in some detail
Headrick's quite unconventional and startling lifestyle raising Iris and
Ezra.2 52 As a result of this report, the court granted Szwed's motion for
245. Id.
246. Id. Szwed charged that the reason he moved Ethan to San Francisco was because
Headrick was neglecting the children, and because Headrick had admitted to Szwed that he
was having trouble caring for all three children. Id. Szwed also claimed that Headrick had
told Szwed it "was his (Szwed's) turn to take care of Ethan." Id. Headrick claimed, however,
that he left Ethan with Szwed only for a short period, and then had allowed him to stay
because Ethan was a comfort to Haygood, who had AIDS; Haygood was also an old friend of
Headrick's. Id.
247. Id. at 1408, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
248. Id. at 1407, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 124. The petition named Greenwald and Szwed as the
parents and himself as "the father of the minor's brother and sister." Id.
249. Id. at 1408, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 124. Szwed filed his complaint also as a response to "a
violent confrontation" in April 1987, in which Headrick forcibly tried to take Ethan from his
school. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1409, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
252. Id., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 125. The report claimed, among other things, that Headrick
shared marijuana with the children" 'for 'medicinal' purposes,' "that he expected the children
"'to make their own living arrangements at [his] request or at their own inclination,'" and
that he grew marijuana for a living. Szwed v. Headrick, 90 DAILY J. D.A.R. 7677, 7678 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (facts omitted from certified published opinion). The report concluded:
"'Lewis Headrick lives a counter culture lifestyle. His parenting style seems to force children
into becoming 'responsible adults' far before they are ready.'" Id. The report issued the con-
cern that Headrick could not "'provide a secure, stable home where Ethan's emotional and
physical needs would be met.'" Id.
In contrast, a juvenile probation report obtained from the San Francisco Juvenile Court
which evaluated the Szwed home found that Ethan's grandparents were energetic, young and
healthy. The report found the grandparents willing and able to provide a home for Ethan if
Wayne Szwed did not regain his health, as Wayne had been diagnosed as having ARC, a
precursor to AIDS. 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1409, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 125. The report found that
Ethan's grandparents were able to give him a stable, nurturing environment. Id.
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summary judgment.253
The judgment declared Szwed and Greenwald Ethan's father and
mother, awarded Szwed and his parents joint legal and physical custody
of Ethan, and ordered that Headrick have no custody or visitation
rights.2"4 Headrick appealed, arguing that the court should have applied
the presumption of section 621.255 He argued that the presumption was
"conclusive" and had been upheld against constitutional attack to defeat
the rights of a biological father.2 56  The court of appeal rejected
Headrick's arguments, stating that "[w]ithout grappling with constitu-
tional issues, we may uphold the summary judgment on equitable estop-
pel grounds. '2 7 Headrick unsuccessfully argued that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel should not apply.258 Although he had represented
that Ethan was not his natural son and that Szwed was indeed Ethan's
father, Headrick argued a lack of evidence that Szwed would have done
anything differently had he known that Headrick claimed to be Ethan's
father.
259
In its discussion, the court did not focus solely on the detriment
caused to Szwed by Headrick's representations; estoppel could also be
analyzed from Ethan's point of view. 6 The court noted that in a previ-
ous case, it had stated, "[t]he elements of estoppel have equal application
to establish the relationship between a child and his putative father ....
[In] this type of case the estoppel runs in favor of the child, not the
spouse. 261
Thus, in order to establish an estoppel vis-a-vis the putative fa-
ther, there must be a showing that (1) the putative father repre-
sented to the child that he was his father; (2) the child relied
upon the representation by accepting and treating the putative
253. Id. at 1411, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1415, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
256. Id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal.
3d 461, 674 P.2d 245, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1984)). But see In re Melissa G., 213 Cal. App. 3d
1082, 1085-89, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894, 895-98 (1989); In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 647-51, 532
P.2d 123, 130-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 482-85 (1975) (holding application of presumption
unconstitutional).
257. Szwed, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1415, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 129. "The existence of an estoppel
is generally a question of fact. However, it becomes a question of law when the evidence is not
in conflict and is susceptible of only one reasonable inference." Id. at 1416, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
129.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1416-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 129-30.
261. Id. at 1416, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (quoting In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d
837, 841, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (1975)).
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father as his father; (3) the child was ignorant of the true facts;
and (4) the representation was of such duration that it frus-
trated the realistic opportunity to discover the natural father
and to reestablish the child-parent relationship between the
child and the natural father.262
In earlier cases, courts had used estoppel to compel a man to sup-
port a child when the man had told the child he was the father.263 The
court in Szwed found no reason why estoppel should not apply in the
more unusual case, as here, where Headrick had told Ethan that Szwed,
not Headrick, was Ethan's father.264 The court noted that in this sort of
case, there was no policy risk that applying the doctrine would leave the
child unsupported or fatherless.261 Also, if the previous cases were justi-
fied by the policy of preserving existing father-child relationships, the
same policy would be served by invoking estoppel here.266
The court also balanced the competing interests and noted that
Headrick's sole claim to the title "father" had been the presumption of
section 621.267 Although Szwed had not previously been adjudicated
Ethan's biological father, he had been treated as such by everyone-even
Headrick, until Headrick filed his action.26 Headrick had never claimed
to be Ethan's biological father and at the time of the suit had no existing
parent-child relationship with Ethan.269 His interest was thus "abstract"
and not as "weighty" as that of an asserted biological parent.270 More-
over, Headrick could not allege there was any threat to him to " 'disrupt
an established family and damage reputations.' "271
The court in Szwed emphasized the existing father-child relationship
between Szwed and Ethan and its interest in protecting such a relation-
262. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41
(1975)); accord In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123
(1979).
263. See, eg., Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 850-51, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 123; Valle, 53 Cal.
App. 3d at 840-41, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
264. Szwed, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1416, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1413, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. He also had no current relationship with Ethan's mother, who had moved to Aus-
tralia. Id.
271. Id. (quoting Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 593 P.2d 226, 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529,
534 (1979)).
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ship.272 In protecting the state's interests, 273 the court was also able to
further the interests of both the putative father and the child. The court
did not have to make a hard decision, because there was no family unit
regarding Headrick and Ethan that the court felt compelled to protect.
And, because Headrick had always represented that Szwed was Ethan's
father, it was easy for the court to invoke the doctrine of estoppel to
reach its decision.
B. Statutory Amendment After Michael H.: Amendment to Section
621 of the California Evidence Code
The California legislature amended section 621 of the California Ev-
idence Code2 74 after the United States Supreme Court decision in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 2 75 Section 621 now gives both the putative fa-
ther and child the right to attempt to rebut the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy in certain circumstances, whereas previously only the
mother's husband or the mother had that right.2 70 By enacting this
amendment, California has joined the majority of states that allows the
putative father and child the opportunity to attempt to rebut the pre-
sumption. The amendment seems to be the legislature's attempt to pro-
tect the rights of both putative fathers and their children. The
amendment accomplishes its goal to some degree. However, this author
contends the amendment fails on several grounds. Specifically, the
amendment inadequately defines important terms, unjustly relegates the
biological father's rights to the whims of the mother, is vague, has unfair
requirements, and has an ambiguous statute of limitations clause.
The first problem with the amendment is that it specifies that the
only father permitted to attempt to rebut the presumption is a "presumed
father," and the definition provided for "presumed father" is too restric-
tive. The relevant portion of the amendment, subdivision (c), provides in
pertinent part, "[t]he notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision
(b) may be filed not later than two years from the child's date of birth by
the husband, or for purposes of establishing paternity by the presumed
father or the child through or by the child's guardian ad litem. ' 27 7 Sub-
paragraph (h) of the amendment instructs the reader to look to section
272. Id. at 1413-14, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
273. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's interests in
cases involving the conclusive presumption of legitimacy.
274. Ch. 543, § 2 (codified at CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1991)).
275. 491 U.S. 110 (1989), aff'g 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
276. See supra note 3.
277. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(e) (West Supp. 1991).
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7004 of the California Civil Code278 for the meaning of "presumed
father.
279
Section 7004 of the Civil Code is part of California's enactment of
the Uniform Parentage Act280 (UPA), which was adopted in response to
problems in enforcing parental obligations, such as child support, to ille-
gitimate children.28 1 The definition of presumed father in section 7004
depends very heavily on the type of relationship the man has or had with
the child's mother, and the mother's wishes regarding the father. Sub-
paragraph (1) of section 7004 provides for situations where the man and
the child's mother are or have been married; subparagraph (2) provides
for situations where the man and the mother attempted to marry before
the child was born; and subparagraph (3) provides for situations where
the man and the mother attempted to marry after the child was born.
282
278. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1991).
279. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621(h) (West Supp. 1991).
280. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1-30, 9B U.L.A. 296-345 (1987 & Supp. 1990); see Uni-
form Parentage Act, ch. 1244, § 11, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3196-201 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 7000-21 (West Supp. 1991)).
281. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 15, 9B U.L.A. 324. One of the purposes of the UPA is to
ensure that regardless of the marital status of the parents, all children of all parents have equal
rights with respect to each other. Id. § 2, at 296. The UPA tries to eliminate many of the
common-law notions about illegitimacy, and substitutes recognition of a parent-child relation-
ship for the traditional labels of legitimacy and illegitimacy. See id. One example of the pro-
tection the UPA affords is requiring child support payments to illegitimate children. E.g., id.
§ 15, at 324.
The UPA has been adopted by seventeen states in various forms. Id. at 2 (Supp. 1990),
These states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washing-
ton and Wyoming. Id.
The UPA defines a parent-child relationship as "the legal relationship existing between a
child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights,
privileges, duties and obligations." Id. § 1, at 296.
282. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1991). Section 7004 states:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets the conditions as
set forth in section 621 of the Evidence Code or in any of the following paragraphs:
(1) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other
and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the
marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a court.
(2) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have attempted
to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with
law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and,
(i) If the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court,
the child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days
after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce; or
(ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the child is
born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation.
(3) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married, or
attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent com-
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The subparagraph most relevant to the present discussion is subpara-
graph (4), which states that a man is presumed to be the natural father of
a child if "he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his natural child.
'283
Defining presumed father as subparagraph (4) of section 7004 does
is unjust to unwed or putative fathers, because under it, a biological fa-
ther's opportunity to qualify as a presumed father depends upon the
wishes of the child's mother. If the mother does not wish to marry the
biological father, or does not give him the opportunity to "receive[] the
child into his home and openly hold[] out the child as his natural
child," '284 the biological father cannot meet the statutory requirements of
"presumed father." Therefore, the statutory classification allows a
mother or the state to prevent an unwed father from taking the opportu-
nity interest identified by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr v.
Robertson,2" 5 and developing a constitutionally cognizable relationship
with his child.286 For example, if a woman has a short-lived affair with a
man and then ends their relationship, never telling him that she is preg-
nant, even if he discovers the truth at some later time, he has no legal
recourse. If the mother prevents the father from seeing the child, it will
be impossible for him to meet presumed father status under the amend-
ment; he cannot even meet the "relationship" standard from Lehr. A
putative father's rights should not depend on the whims of the mother.
It is interesting to note that this California statute, Civil Code sec-
pliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared
invalid, and
(i) With his consent he is named as the child's father on the child's birth
certificate, or
(ii) He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary prom-
ise or by court order.
(4) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child.
Id.
283. Id. § 7004(4).
284. Id.
285. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). In Lehr, the Court stated, "Etihe significance of the biological
connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring." Id. at 262.
286. In W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979), the
court stated that "with respect to a non-marital child, the mother may, by her conduct, pre-
vent the male from acquiring the status of 'presumed father' which would have given him a
veto over adoption." Id. at 310, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 867; see also In re Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d
624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978) (recognizing that mother may prevent natural father from
establishing minimum contact required to become presumed father); Adoption of Rebecca B.,
68 Cal. App. 3d 193, 198, 137 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (1977) (implying that mother may, by her
conduct, prevent biological father from obtaining minimal contact with child required to con-
fer presumed father status).
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tion 7004(a), which makes the father's rights dependent upon the
mother's wishes and behavior, represents a substantial modification of
the UPA. Civil Code section 7004(a) omits subsection (5) of the UPA,
which provides:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed
with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which
shall promptly inform the mother of the filing of the acknowl-
edgment, and she does not dispute the acknowledgment within
a reasonable time after being informed thereof, in a writing filed
with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau]. If an-
other man is presumed under this section to be the child's fa-
ther, acknowledgment may be effected only with the written
consent of the presumed father or after the presumption has
been rebutted. 87
The UPA, then, gives the father an opportunity to achieve presumed fa-
ther status, even if the mother refuses to marry him or refuses to allow
him to receive the child into his home. By filing a written acknowledg-
ment of paternity, the father may become presumed unless the mother
actually disputes his claim of paternity. However, even if the mother
does dispute the father's paternity claim, the court may still determine
that the man is the child's father. Although the UPA does not make the
father's rights dependent on the mother's actions, California's modifica-
tion of the UPA does. By cutting off a man's opportunity to be classified
as a presumed father, the California statutory scheme prevents a father
both from establishing a relationship with his child and from attempting
to rebut the conclusive presumption of legitimacy.
Another problem with thestatutory classification is that subpara-
graph (4) of section 7004 is vague. It simply states that for a natural
father to qualify as a presumed father, he must "receive[] the child into
his home and openly hold[] out the child as his natural child."28 The
statute gives no guidance as to how long the child must remain in the
287. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 4(a)(5), 9B U.L.A. 299. California completely omitted this
provision, but in 1987 added a different subsection (a)(5) to section 7004. The California pro-
vision states:
(5) If the child was born and resides in a nation with which the United States engages
in an orderly Departure Program or successor program, he acknowledges that he is
the child's father in a declaration under penalty of perjury, as specified in Section
2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This paragraph shall remain in effect only
until January 1, 1997, and on that date shall become inoperative.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(5) (West Supp. 1991).
288. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004(4) (West Supp. 1991).
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father's home or for how long the father must openly hold out the child
as his own. Furthermore, it is conceivable that a situation could arise in
which a man may know that a child is his, and may hold out that child as
his biological child, but be prevented from residing with the child. In
this case, the man would be denied presumed father status through no
fault of his own.
These problems with subparagraph (4) of section 7004 of the Civil
Code demonstrate that it will often be very difficult, if not impossible, for
a man to meet the qualifications to achieve presumed father status.
Therefore, the amendment to section 621 of the Evidence Code, which
allows a presumed father an opportunity to attempt to rebut the conclu-
sive presumption, but depends upon the definition of presumed father
provided in section 7004 of the Civil Code, does not go far enough in
allowing putative fathers the right to attempt to rebut the presumption.
A broader definition of presumed father is necessary to protect the rights
of these men and their potential parent-child relationships.
Of course, one of the aims of the Act, of which section 7004 of the
Civil Code is one part, is to distinguish between natural and presumed
fathers and to afford different rights to each.2 89 This is as it should be,
because the title "father" should not entitle a man to disrupt an existing
family unit in which the child's best interests290 are being met. A court
should not rule in favor of a putative father where there is no evidence of
an established relationship between the child and the putative father.291
The United States Supreme Court has never recognized the biological
relationship alone as creating a protected interest for putative fathers.292
However, when there is evidence that an established relationship does
exist, even if the putative father does not meet the stringent requirements
enabling him to qualify as a presumed father, courts should protect both
the putative father's rights to continue the relationship with his child,
and the child's rights to continue the relationship with the putative fa-
ther. In fact, if the best interests of the child standard were utilized as
the overriding concern of the courts in these cases, it is unlikely that the
court would find a reason to disrupt an ongoing, stable and harmonious
relationship between a putative father and his child.
However, California's amendment permits the child to attempt to
289. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr §§ 1-4, 9B U.L.A. 296-99.
290. See supra note 11 for an explanation of the best interests of the child doctrine, and
infra notes 316-17 for some of the factors that are used by some courts in determining the best
interests of the child.
291. See supra notes 48, 72, 87-93 & 97-103 and accompanying text.
292. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see supra notes 87-92 & 102-03.
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rebut the presumption.293 Therefore, even if a putative father does not
meet the requirements of presumed father, and is thereby precluded from
attempting to establish his paternity, the child will be able to bring an
action. In this way, the amendment affords some protection to the child
and the parent-child relationship.
The amendment can also be criticized on grounds that apply to the
rights of both the presumed father and the child. The amendment to
subparagraph (c) which was first proposed provided, "[t]he notice of mo-
tion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the husband, a
presumed father, or the child not later than two years from the child's
date of birth."2 94 However, the wording of the amendment that was
eventually adopted is somewhat different. The relevant portion now pro-
vides, "[t]he notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may
be filed not later than two years from the child's date of birth by the
husband, or for purposes of establishing paternity by the presumed fa-
ther, or the child through or by the child's guardian ad litem. ' ,295 The
amendment is not as clear as the earlier proposal about whether the two-
year statute of limitations applies only to the husband, or is also applica-
ble to the presumed father and child.
It is likely that the ambiguity regarding the statute of limitations in
the amendment will stimulate controversy and questions. Although ar-
guably, if the husband must file his motion for blood tests within two
years, it is reasonable that a presumed father should be subject to the
same time period, it seems clear that claims can be made to the contrary.
A situation could arise in which a woman has a sexual relationship with
a man, conceives a child, and then ends the relationship, without telling
the man she is pregnant. He may not find out for several years about the
child who resulted from that affair. A presumed father may therefore
require more time than the husband in which to attempt to rebut the
presumption.296 A similar argument can be made for the child, because
he or she may have no way of finding out that he or she has a putative
father.
293. See supra note 276, infra note 295 and accompanying text.
294. Cal. S.B. 2015 (unenacted version presented to Senate on Feb. 15, 1990; proposal then
amended in Senate on Apr. 4, 1990, and amended in Assembly on July 6, 1990).
295. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c) (West Supp. 1991).
296. If this is the case, the putative father would have had no opportunity to establish a
relationship with his child, and it may be detrimental to the child to allow this stranger to
come into his life as his father after a long time. However, foreclosing a putative father from
establishing a relationship with a child whom he has only recently discovered might also be a
violation of the putative father's rights. See infra notes 326-31 and accompanying text for
discussion of a method of balancing the child's interests with the putative father's interests.
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Although the UPA places a time limit upon when persons, other
than the child, may bring an action to determine the existence or nonex-
istence of the father-child relationship when there is a presumed fa-
ther,2 97 the UPA and most UPA states have a longer statute of
limitations than does California.298 The UPA allows such an action to be
brought within "a reasonable time [period] after obtaining knowledge of
relevant facts, but in no event later than [five] years after the child's
birth."2 99 There are seventeen states that have adopted the UPA and
that include a time limit that restricts when such actions can be
brought."ca A majority of these states also have a five-year statute of
limitations.3 1 Although it is true that some states have a three- or four-
year statute, California's two-year statute is the shortest among all the
seventeen states that have adopted the UPA.3 °2
California's amendment allows men who can meet the requirements
to obtain presumed father status the opportunity to attempt to rebut the
conclusive presumption.30 3 It also allows children to attempt to rebut
the presumption,3" and by doing so, affords some protection to the child
and the parent-child relationship. There are, however, some serious
problems with the amendment. It does not go far enough in protecting
putative fathers, and it also does not make any provision for protecting
297. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 289 (1987).
298. Compare id. (allowing child, biological mother, or presumed father to bring action up
to five years after child's birth) with CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c) (West Supp. 1991) (allowing
husband, presumed father, or child to bring action up to two years from child's birth).
299. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 289.
300. ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to -21 (1986 & Supp. 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 801-819 (1990); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1985 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2501-2526 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to -
1129 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-.74 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 210.817-.852 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -135 (1990); NEv.
REv. STAT. §§ 126.011-.391 (1986 & Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to -59 (West
Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (1981); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 3111.01-.19 (Baldwin 1989 & Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8-1 to -27 (1988); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010-.905 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -
120 (1986).
301. For states that have a five-year time limit restricting such actions see: ALA. CODE
§ 26-17-6(a) (1986 & Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107(1)(b) (1986); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 584-6(a)(2) (1985 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2508 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.826(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-108(1)(b) (1990); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(1)(b) (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-104(a)(ii) (1986).
302. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c) (West Supp. 1991).
303. Id.
304. Id.
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the best interests of the child, even though it does allow the child to
attempt to rebut the presumption.
V. PROPOSAL
Undoubtedly, upholding the integrity of the family unit is a worthy
goal. In some cases, however, the integrity of the family unit has been
disturbed even before a putative father attempts to rebut the conclusive
presumption of legitimacy.30 5 In such a case, allowing a man who may
be the biological father and who has established a relationship with his
child an opportunity to attempt to prove his paternity would do little
harm to the integrity of the family, which has already been disrupted.
Moreover, preventing him from doing so may even deprive him of his
constitutional rights.3 06
Besides the fact that the family integrity may already have been dis-
turbed, there are other reasons why upholding that integrity may not be
the most important societal goal. In our contemporary society, nearly
one out of every two marriages ends in divorce.30 7 There is little need to
uphold the sanctity and integrity of the traditional nuclear family where
the marriage is defunct. Furthermore, the stigma of illegitimacy is de-
creasing in our society, which is composed of many non-traditional
households, such as single parent homes and homes headed by step-par-
ents.3 °0 Finally, if a man is coming forward with the desire to establish
his paternity, the state will most likely be released from the financial bur-
den of supporting that child.
Therefore, although maintaining the integrity of the family unit still
does and will always warrant much protection, it should no longer be the
most significant interest when deciding whether a putative father should
be permitted to attempt to rebut the conclusive presumption. There are
other interests that must play a more important role in making these
determinations. That is why the traditional balancing test that has been
applied in the past and that focuses on the integrity of the family unit has
not always obtained just results.
Among the more important interests that must be considered in
305. See, eg., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); In re Melissa G., 213 Cal.
App. 3d 1082, 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1989).
306. See supra notes 32-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unwed father's
rights, and how these rights were established by the United States Supreme Court.
307. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
79 (106th ed. 1986); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 85 tbl. 127 (109th ed. 1989).
308. See 2 LYNN WARDLE ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICY
AND PRACTICE § 9:01, at 3 (1988).
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these cases is the "best interests of the child," which is a foremost consid-
eration of California courts in most actions concerning minor chil-
dren.3"c The doctrine states that the welfare and interests of the child
should be the focal points of any action in which the child is involved.3 t°
Although it is true that the child's interests have been considered in pre-
vious conclusive presumption of legitimacy cases, the role the child's in-
terests have played has not always been strong enough. Although it will
often be in the child's best interests to maintain the family unit, a case
may arise in which this assumption may not be true. For this reason,
courts should explicitly consider the child's best interests when determin-
ing whether a putative father should be permitted to attempt to rebut the
presumption.
Interestingly enough, for adoption purposes, the custody rights of an
unwed father who does not qualify as a presumed father under section
7004 of the Civil Code3" are already determined by applying the best
interests of the child test.31 2 That is, if custody by the father is in the
child's best interest, then the father's consent is required for the adop-
tion. However, if it is determined that adoption is in the child's best
interest, then the father's rights are terminated and his consent is not
required.
Nevertheless, the best interests standard is not the complete answer
to the problem. It has been criticized because it lacks specificity and the
criteria for its application are often unclear.313 When making child cus-
309. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 7608 (West Supp. 1984) (courts must consider best inter-
ests of child in determining whether child should be deemed dependent child of court); id.
§ 7017(d)(2).
310. See, eg., id. § 4600(b) (West Supp. 1991) ("Custody should be awarded... according
to the best interests of the child pursuant to section 4608."); see supra note 11.
311. See supra note 282.
312. California Civil Code § 7017(d)(2) provides:
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural father claims
parental rights, the court shall determine if he is the father. The court shall then
determine if it is in the best interest of the child that the father retain his parental
rights, or that an adoption of the child be allowed to proceed. The court, in making
that determination, may consider all relevant evidence, including the efforts made by
the father to obtain custody, the age and prior placement of the child and the effects
of a change of placement on the child. If the court finds that it is in the best interest
of the child that the father should be allowed to retain his parental rights, it shall
order that his consent is necessary for an adoption. If the court finds that the man
claiming parental rights is not the father, or that if he is the father it is in the child's
best interest that an adoption be allowed to proceed, it shall order that that person's
consent is not required for an adoption; such a finding terminates all parental rights
and responsibilities with respect to the child. Section 4600 does not apply to this
proceeding. Nothing in this section changes the rights of a presumed father.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
313. See, eg., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) ("the 'best interests of the child' standard offers little guidance to judges,
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tody determinations in divorce situations, for example, California judges
are instructed to look to section 4608 of the Civil Code, which requires
courts to consider: (1) "[t]he health, safety, and welfare of the child"; (2)
"[a]ny history of abuse by one parent against the child or against the
other parent"; and (3) "[tlhe nature and amount of contact with both
parents." '314 In addition to these specified factors, section 4608 also in-
structs courts to consider any other factors they find relevant.315
In another section of the California Civil Code, in the adoption con-
text, the legislature has specified the following criteria should be consid-
ered in determining what is in the best interests of the child:
Consideration of the best interests of the child shall include, but
not be limited to, an assessment of the child's age, the extent of
bonding with the prospective adoptive parent or parents, the
extent of bonding or the potential to bond with the natural par-
ent or parents, and the ability of the natural parent or parents
to provide adequate and proper care and guidance to the
child.316
Although these specified criteria are still somewhat vague, and their ap-
plication depend largely upon the facts of each particular case, they are
at least a starting point. Other factors that have been considered in child
custody determinations in California include: mental instability; alcohol
and drug problems; frequent changes in residence; relationships with
step-parents and step-siblings; heterosexual or homosexual relationships;
children's preferences; and religion.317
Factors other than the best interests of the child and the state's in-
terest in upholding the integrity of the family should also be considered.
and may effectively encourage them to rely on their own personal values"); HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 788 (2d ed. 1988); Chris-
tian Reichel Van Deusen, The Best Interest of the Child and the Law, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 417,
419 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 480-86 (1984).
314. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1991).
315. Id.
316. Id. § 226(a); see also id. § 7017(d)(2) ('The court, in making that determination, may
consider all relevant evidence, including the efforts made by the father to obtain custody, the
age and prior placement of the child and the effects of a change of placement on the child.").
317. See, eg., Birdsall v. Birdsall (In re Marriage of Birdsall), 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 243
Cal. Rptr. 287 (1988); Urband v. Urband (In re Marriage of Urband), 68 Cal. App. 3d 796,
797-98, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433, 433 (1977); Nadler v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63
Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967); Immerman v. Immerman, 176 Cal. App. 2d 122, 126-27, 1 Cal. Rptr.
298, 301 (1959); Colombo v. Colombo, 71 Cal. App. 2d 577, 162 P.2d 995 (1945).
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) sets forth specific factors courts should
consider when making custody determinations, which are to be made according to the best
interest of the child. Section 402 of the UMDA provides that:
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A putative father has an interest in establishing a relationship with his
child,31 and a mother may have an interest in establishing the biological
father's identity.319 Because many interests must be considered when a
man wants to attempt to rebut the conclusive presumption of legitimacy,
one solution would be to hold a preliminary hearing to enable the court
to weigh the evidence and all the interests involved. Factors that should
be considered include:
(1) the best interests of the child;
(2) the age of the child;
(3) the potential harm that might result to the child if paternity is
disproved;
(4) whether there is an existing father-child relationship;
The Court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child.
The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best inter-
est;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. The court shall
not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to
the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
Michigan's Child Custody Act enumerates factors for analyzing the best interests of the
child that are even more exhaustive than those listed in the UMDA. The following are the
factors to be considered by Michigan courts:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved
and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affec-
tion, and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of the child in its
religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under
the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and
the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or
homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of suffi-
cient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent.
(k) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(3) (Callaghan 1984).
318. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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(5) the length of time after the putative father discovered that he
might be the biological father before he acted;
(6) the length of time during which the putative father assumed the
role of father; and
(7) all other factors that might affect the interests of those involved.
Consideration of these factors would yield more just results than either
the traditional balancing test previously used32 or the recently enacted
amendment to section 621 of the California Evidence Code.
321
If the factors listed above had been considered in the Michael H. v.
Gerald D. 322 decision, the outcome might have been different. The psy-
chologist's report had recommended that Michael remain a member of
Victoria's family.323 The psychologist had perceived Michael "as the sin-
gle adult in Victoria's life most committed to caring for her needs on a
long-term basis."324 Thus, the best interests of the child alone might
have warranted allowing Michael to attempt to rebut the presumption.
In addition to the best interests of the child, some other factors weighed
in Michael's favor, including: (1) the length of time after Michael discov-
ered that he might be Victoria's father and before he acted, which was
immediately, and (2) the length of time during which he assumed the role
of father, which was whenever Carole allowed him to do so.
Victoria was already seven years old when the United States
Supreme Court finally heard the case.325 This would weigh in favor of
Gerald, both because of her age and because of the potential harm that
might result to Victoria if Gerald's paternity were disproved, particularly
because she had lived with him for so many years. Consideration of
whether there was an existing father-child relationship would, most
probably, also favor Gerald, because he had had more time and opportu-
nity to establish such a relationship with Victoria, and it is therefore
likely that such a relationship existed.
It is clear that any solution to the problem presented when an un-
wed father wishes to rebut the conclusive presumption of legitimacy
must protect that unwed father's constitutional rights. However, these
are very complex cases, and as previously stated, the unwed father's in-
320. See supra notes 114-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that utilized
the balancing test.
321. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
322. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
323. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1001, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 813 (1987),
aff'd, 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
324. Id.
325. Victoria's date of birth is May 11, 1981. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113. The United
States Supreme Court heard the case on October 1, 1988. Id. at 110.
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terests are not the only interests that must be protected. The best inter-
ests of the child must be considered as well, along with the state's and
mother's interests. An adequate proposal must consider all of the inter-
ests involved.
The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act (UPUFA) is, per-
haps, a more interesting and more inclusive alternative than that
presented above. In an attempt to clarify the rights of putative fathers
with respect to their rights involving custody, visitation, and adoption of
their children, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the UPUFA in 1988. 311 Section 5 of the UPUFA
provides a rather exhaustive list of fourteen factors that courts should use
in determining the parental rights of the putative father, that is, whether
those rights should be preserved or terminated. 327 The list includes such
326. UNIF. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FATHERS AcT 9B U.L.A. at 22 (Supp. 1990). The
intent of the Act was "to codify United States Supreme Court decisions and to provide answers
to some questions left by those decisions." Id.
The prefatory note to the Act discussed the importance and timeliness of the attempt to
clarify the legal aspects of putative and unknown fathers, "a group that is expanding annually
at an astounding rate." Id. at 23. The note cited the dramatic increase in out-of-wedlock
births. In 1960, 5.3% of all births were "illegitimate," while in 1980 illegitimate births ac-
counted for 18.4% of all births. Id. at 22. In 1985, there were 828,200 out-of-wedlock births,
which represented 22% of the 3.7 million births that year. Therefore, every fourth or fifth
child born in 1985 had a putative or unknown father. Id.
There is no indication that these percentages of out-of-wedlock births will not continue to
increase, especially since the number of unmarried cohabiting couples is still rising. In 1988,
2.6 million unmarried couples were living together, an increase from 1.9 million in 1985. Id. at
23. About 31% of these unmarried cohabitants, or 802,000, had children under 15 in their
households, which was a fourfold increase over the 200,000 in 1970. Id.
327. Id. § 5, 9B U.L.A. The factors are as follows:
(1) the age of the child;
(2) the nature and quality of any relationship between the man and the child;
(3) the reasons for any lack of a relationship between the man and the child;
(4) whether a parent and child relationship has been established between the child
and another man;
(5) whether the child has been abused or neglected;
(6) whether the man has a history of substance abuse or of abuse of the mother or the
child;
(7) any proposed plan for the child;
(8) whether the man seeks custody and is able to provide the child with emotional or
financial support and a home, whether or not he has had opportunity to establish a
parent and child relationship with the child;
(9) whether the man visits the child, has shown any interest in visitation, or, desiring
visitation, has been effectively denied an opportunity to visit the child;
(10) whether the man is providing financial support for the child according to his
means;
(11) whether the man provided emotional or financial support for the mother during
prenatal, natal, and postnatal care;
(12) the circumstances of the child's conception, including whether the child was
conceived as a result of incest or forcible rape;
(13) whether the man has formally or informally acknowledged or declared his possi-
ble paternity of the child; and
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factors as the quality of any relationship between the man and the child,
the reasons for the lack of any relationship between the man and the
child, whether there is a proposed plan for the child, whether the man
has shown any interest in the child, including both financial and emo-
tional support, and whether the man is seeking custody of the child, re-
gardless of whether or not he has had a previous opportunity to establish
a relationship with the child.32 The UPUFA protects the putative fa-
ther's fights as well as the child's welfare by including factors highly
related to the best interests of the child.
The UPUFA goes even further to protect the child. If a man is
determined by the court to be the father, "the court, after considering
evidence of the factors in section 5, shall determine (i) whether a familial
bond between the father and the child has been established; or (ii)
whether the failure to establish a familial bond is justified, and the father
has the desire and potential to establish the bond., 329 Section 6
continues:
(d) If the court makes an affirmative determination under sub-
section (c), the court may terminate the parental rights of the
father [, in accordance with [applicable state law],] only if fail-
ure to do so would be detrimental to the child. If the court
does not make an affirmative determination, it may terminate
the parental rights of the father if doing so is in the best interest
of the child.3 °
Therefore, the UPLJFA provides that when the court determines the
father's failure to establish a relationship with his child is justified, and
the father wishes to establish a relationship at the present time, he must
be given the opportunity to do so unless it would be detrimental to the
child. In this manner, the UPUFA protects the rights of a putative fa-
ther who cannot qualify as a presumed father as defined under the Cali-
fornia statutory scheme, 331 and it also protects the best interests of the
child. By doing so, it is a more appropriate solution to the predicament
presented by the conclusive presumption of legitimacy than is the amend-
ment to section 621 of the California Evidence Code.332
(14) other factors the court considers relevant to the standards for making an order,
as stated in Section 6(d) and (g).
Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. § 6(c).
330. Id. § 6(d).
33 1. See supra note 282.
332. See supra note 277.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The conclusive presumption of legitimacy has long been recog-
nized.333 Because of changing social needs and mores the presumption
has been losing its conclusiveness, and California, like most states, now
allows the husband, wife, putative father or child to attempt to rebut it
when certain conditions are met.334 A need for the presumption remains,
however, because the stigma of illegitimacy still exists, and the state does
not want to assume the financial burden of supporting children whose
fathers are avoiding their responsibilities.335 Most important, the state
wants to protect and uphold the integrity of the family unit.336
Until now, despite the "conclusiveness" of this presumption, Cali-
fornia courts have found ways to avoid its application. 337 Courts have
applied the presumption in the presence of an intact family, but have
disregarded the presumption and focused more on the interests of the
putative father and child, and their relationship, in the absence of an
intact family. It is likely that courts will continue to disregard the pre-
sumption when they wish to protect interests other than those of an in-
tact family unit.
There are many factors that should be considered when a man
wishes to dispute the presumption of legitimacy, because there are so
many important interests involved.338 The recent amendment to section
621331 of the California Evidence Code does not adequately protect all
the interests implicated in these complex cases. These cases may be too
difficult for legislative solutions, and might be better handled in case-by-
case determinations by courts. The alternatives proposed in this Com-
ment are considerations that courts should take into account when deter-
mining whether a putative father should be permitted to attempt to rebut
the presumption. These factors represent an attempt to protect all the
interests involved, affording the most deference to the best interests of the
child, while adequately protecting the unwed father's constitutional
rights.
Mindy S. Halpern*
333. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 3, 276, 295 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 114-25, 192-272 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 14 & 274.
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